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ABSTRACT 
 The significance of military partnerships and diplomatic relationships between the 
United States and its allies remains paramount as our focus shifts from counter-terrorism 
to competition among great powers. The trust between the U.S. and its partners, as well 
as its own trustworthiness and influence, remains critical to military engagements, 
operations, and exercises. The understanding of trust, trustworthiness, and their influence 
can be better determined and focused through the application of social network analysis 
(SNA). This thesis explores those concepts and then applies SNA to a case study of the 
U.S. and Chinese relationships with Kenya in an effort to illustrate how SNA can be 
applied to visualize and analyze networks for information-operations planning and policy 
implementation. 
 This thesis employs SNA to analyze the case study of Kenya and propose how 
this can then be used to focus efforts to grow trust in certain relationships, or enhance the 
U.S.’s trustworthiness, to maximize influence or mitigate China’s influence. 
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The 2017 United States National Security Strategy initiated significant changes in 
the manner in which the U.S. military and Department of State frame and view conflict by 
identifying a growing concern over near-peer adversaries, China and Russia, while 
simultaneously removing emphasis on non-state actors. As the United States government 
transitions its efforts from counter-terrorism operations towards acknowledgement of an 
international environment defined by great power competition, it becomes necessary to 
reacquaint itself with methods designed to identify where U.S. influence dominates and 
where it is being challenged.1 These changes in focus, however, do not necessarily reset 
all U.S. military and diplomatic efforts in counter-terrorism; rather, they highlight the 
importance of maintaining longstanding relationships with partner nations. In Africa, for 
instance, Kenya remains one of the top partner states and number one force provider in 
combatting terrorism on the continent. Kenya’s importance will not diminish in light of 
great power competition, but China’s growing economic and military presence in 
surrounding countries raises questions of continued U.S. influence and trusted partnership.  
Within the African continent there exists myriad players, both regional and 
international, seeking to wield influence for many reasons. Due to its strategic importance 
along the coastline and shared borders with some of the more volatile countries in eastern 
Africa, Kenya stands to benefit greatly from outside interests. Kenya’s own dynamics, 
however, continue to cause outside speculation2 of the administration’s capacity to 
overcome its own struggles and become the prominent and independent regional partner 
that Africa, and the rest of the world, needs Kenya to be. Africa’s projected population 
growth3 and the significant proportion of United Nations (UN) votes the continent 
 
1 “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (United States, The White House, 
December 2017), 27, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-
0905-2.pdf. 
2 “Kenya,” Millennium Challenge Corporation, accessed November 15, 2019, https://www.mcc.gov/
where-we-work/country/kenya. 
3 “Population,” December 14, 2015, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/population/
index.html. 
2 
represents makes Africa of particular interest for both economic growth and diplomatic 
relations. Kenya’s position as the leading economy in the eastern region as well as its role 
as the largest force provider in counter-terrorism measures in Somalia prove maintaining 
this relationship should remain of the utmost importance for the United States. Kenya’s 
port at Mombasa has, historically, been a critical gateway for trade for all of its landlocked 
neighbors, allowing for goods to come in and out of the continent.4  
In 1995, Martin Libicki argued that “information and information technologies are 
increasingly important to national security in general and to warfare specifically,” and 
“advanced conflict will increasingly be characterized by the struggle over information 
systems.”5 In the last twenty years of warfare, the phrase “winning the hearts and minds” 
has become a mantra used first in the military and then in U.S. popular culture. While 
warfare is far more nuanced than this now cliché phrase suggests, it has helped focus our 
attention on military interactions. Relationships at every echelon of the military structure 
with partner forces, like those with Kenya, as well as local populations during any 
operation or exercise, are paramount for success. It follows, then, that in order to compete 
in great power competition, the United States’ information operations should continue to 
expand its capabilities as well as better hone current skills. One such capability, social 
network analysis (SNA), could assist information operations professionals in cultivating 
effective and long-lasting influence. SNA provides, as Cunningham et al. note, “a 
collection of useful, powerful, and specialized tools,” which, “when used in conjunction 
with reliable data collection… can provide a perspective that is otherwise unavailable with 
traditional methods.”6 It can also assist in understanding where there may be a breakdown 
in relationships, where trust is faltering, and where the U.S. may want to highlight its own 
trustworthiness. It also offers information operations practitioners tools to collect relational 
data about the individuals or organizations they wish to target and then visualize those 
 
4 Daniel Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963–2011 (London, England: Yale University 
Press, 2011), 1–299.  
5 Martin C. Libicki, What Is Information Warfare? (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 
1995), ix. 
6 Daniel Cunningham, Sean Everton, and Philip Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic 
Framework for the Use of Social Network Analysis (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 3. 
3 
networks in order to best formulate plans for engagement and influence. SNA, by itself, 
cannot provide an answer in terms of knowing who and how to influence; however, it can 
assist those in planning operations better understand the implications of the activities they 
plan as well as how to best focus efforts.  
The next chapter looks at the concepts of trust, trustworthiness, and influence as 
discussed in prominent scholarship on each of the topics. The third chapter then walks 
through the terms and basic concepts of SNA and how they will be applied in the fourth 
chapter. An analysis of the military and diplomatic relationships over a ten-year span 
between the U.S. and Kenya, as well as China and Kenya, comprise the fourth chapter. As 
relationships bear great impact on behavior and decision-making, this thesis proposes that 
the application of SNA can provide another tool to assist in planning and implementing 
information operations and can potentially offer a method in tracking the impacts on those 
existing relationships as time passes. 
  
4 
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II. TRUST, TRUSTWORTHINESS, AND INFLUENCE 
The long-standing relationship between the United States and Kenya remains 
critical to engagements on the continent while other international actors’ burgeoning 
influences may appear to challenge these ties. The U.S. and Kenya regularly interact in 
both military and diplomatic realms, partnering together for decades to mitigate the threat 
of terrorist groups in the region. This partnership in “counterterrorism has become an 
economic instrument for Kenya’s security forces and a tool that the Kenyan government 
uses to leverage diplomatic its diplomatic relationship with the United States.”7 
Throughout this enduring partnership and economic dependence, the U.S.’s and Kenya’s 
interests have overlapped; the U.S. has maintained forces in the Horn of Africa (HOA) for 
decades, and Kenya has become one of the largest beneficiaries of a variety of programs 
from the U.S. China’s growing presence in and around Kenya, however, continues to raise 
question marks as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) increases its military footprint. As 
a result, the requisite trust to partner with military forces, as well as the influence both the 
U.S. and Kenya exercise on one another, should be part of the calculus for future 
engagements. Here I will discuss trust, trustworthiness, and the influence that each wields 
in interactions between the U.S. and Kenya as well as China and Kenya. Understanding 
from where trust is derived, how trustworthiness impacts trust, and what those two concepts 
do for the capacity to influence can better affect the implementation of SNA into 
information operations planning and policy.  
A. TRUST 
Trust is given from one party to another, afforded to an entity based on relational 
factors that each entity may or may not have expressly agreed to prior to the interaction.8 
In international relationships between states that, presumably, act solely in their own self-
interest, how is trust cultivated? According to Cook, Hardin, and Levi, “trust exists when 
 
7 Jeremy Prestholdt, “Kenya, The United States, and Counterterrorism,” Africa Today 57, no. 4 
(Summer 2011): 5. 
8 George A. Akerloff, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, no. 3 (August 1970): 488–500. 
6 
one party… believes the other party has less incentive to act in his or her own interest or 
to take his or her interests to heart.”9 This applies in state-to-state interactions when at least 
one of the states believes their interests overlap or one state’s interest is encapsulated in 
the others.10 Cook et al. also emphasize the need for distrust in certain situations as it helps 
to “limit exploitation and protect those who cannot protect themselves.”11 Perhaps the most 
defining element of Cook et al.’s argument lies in their belief that trust cannot be endowed 
to strangers or large groups and that trustworthiness is generated through repeated 
interactions over time and that “many interactions in which there is successful coordination 
or cooperation do not actually involve trust.”12 In short, they argue that encapsulating 
interests can create cooperation without engendering trust between the parties involved. 
Mark Granovetter, while agreeing that encapsulated interests can be a source of trust, trust 
can, in fact, be endowed to parties unknown to the trustor. It can be afforded through 
relational ties where there is a “capacity to predict and affect their behavior.”13 He relates 
this to how trust in a leader can result from a string of relationships that assure interested 
parties in a leader’s qualities.14 Moreover, he argues that network structure can affect the 
presence of trust. Dense and cohesive networks, for example, help establish and enforce 
social norms (including trust), and the “small worldness” of most networks can facilitate 
the diffusion of trust through a network.15 “The critical point… is that a little trust goes a 
long way: if people can trust those who are vouchsafed for indirectly, then the size of 
structures in which trust matter expands far beyond what would be possible if only direct 
 
9 Karen S. Cook, Russell Hardin, and Margaret Levi, Cooperation Without Trust?, Russell Sage Series 
on Trust 9 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2005), 2. 
10 Cook, Hardin, and Levi, 2. 
11 Cook, Hardin, and Levi, 2. 
12 Cook, Hardin, and Levi, 8. 
13 Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” The American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 
(May 1973): 1374. 
14 Granovetter, 1374. 
15 Duncan J. Watts, Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks Between Order and Randomness 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 1–20. 
7 
ties could be effective.”16 In international relations, building a network of military and 
diplomatic ties can play a significant part in trust and imbues the U.S.’s trustworthiness to 
those who may otherwise be less-likely to engage or where U.S. influence is limited.  
Therefore, the trust between the U.S. and Kenya (or Kenya and China, for that matter), can 
develop through ties with third parties where the direct ties lack strength or do not exist. 
Understanding the structure of a network may then illuminate ties which could assist in 
building that trust between actors that may not otherwise tie directly.  
B. TRUSTWORTHINESS 
Trust and trustworthiness, at first glance, may seem to be the same, but the 
difference is key to understanding how entities engage in cooperative relationships in an 
otherwise anarchical state. Trustworthiness is a slightly different concept in that it is a 
quality of an entity that must be cultivated by that entity through signaling or behavior 
which indicates they can be trusted.17 As Onora O’Neill asserts, trustworthiness 
encompasses the belief that a person or entity is “competent, honest, and reliable,” and 
while all three of those qualities may not be represented in all scenarios when trust is given, 
it is likely to be a combination of at least two.18 As George Akerloff famously wrote about 
in his work on “The Market for ‘Lemons,’” the existence of asymmetric information often 
hinders trust between actors, but that it may still occur with efforts of some actors to signal 
their trustworthiness. Similar to Cook et al.’s position that trust cannot exist between 
strangers, Akerloff asserts that trust can be generated through signaling.19 Trustworthiness 
can also be transmitted through regular cooperation, showing competence, honesty, and 
reliability, ensuring that the actors involved in any given interaction may not be 
disappointed or in any other way cheated. In their work on managing “the commons” (aka, 
common pool resources—CPRs) Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern ask whether or not people 
 
16 Mark S. Granovetter, Society and Economy: Framework and Principles (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2017), 87. 
17 Onora O’Neill, What We Don’t Understand about Trust, TED, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=1PNX6M_dVsk. 
18 O’Neill. 
19 Akerloff, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” 488–500. 
8 
always act in their own self-interest;20 in that same context, do states only act in their own 
self-interest or are there relationships or decisions made for the good of others over 
themselves? In fact, Dietz et al. show how communication can assist in building trust in 
contentious or rivalrous contexts like CPRs.21 And Robert Axelrod has claimed that 
“mutually rewarding relations become so commonplace that the separate identities of the 
participants can become blurred,” which may even change the way the individuals see 
themselves.22 In making his case for trustworthiness, Axelrod highlights the importance 
of the “durability of the relationship” and those involved should look towards the future 
with consideration for the past.23  
The significance of trustworthiness rests in its implications on the behaviors of the 
actors themselves in how they communicate and interact with the other actors in their 
network. In SNA, an actor’s behavior reflects the impact and influence of the structure of 
the network and their position within that network; if the actor’s position sits at the 
periphery of a network, but that actor would like to become more central to the structure, 
their efforts to enhance their trustworthiness may signal that desire. The behavior of 
signaling trustworthiness may also be indicators to an observer or an analyst to what the 
social norms that develop an actor’s trustworthiness may be.  
C. INFLUENCE 
Much of trust and trustworthiness relies on the reciprocity between parties in a 
relationship, drawing on the expectation of cooperation and coordination in most 
interactions. In his seminal work on influence, Robert Cialdini outlined the six “weapons 
of influence,” as he terms them, which enhance the likelihood that an individual will 
“comply with a request”: reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, 
 
20 Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stern, “The Struggle to Govern the Commons,” Science 
302 (December 12, 2003), www.sciencemag.org, 1907–1912. 
21 Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern, 1907–1912. 
22 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Revised (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 179. 
23 Axelrod, 182. 
9 
authority, and scarcity.24 Each of these principles involve trust and trustworthiness to some 
degree. Reciprocity simply means that people are likely to repay an action; this theory 
found support through Axelrod’s examination of cooperation as well, noting that both 
positive and negative reciprocity exists.25 Actors are inclined to repay an action with the 
same action (tit-for-tat) whether it is one of aggression or one of kindness. Cialdini’s 
second principle, commitment and consistency, emphasizes the need for actors to appear 
consistent in repeated interactions. This lends itself well to the previously discussed 
necessity in trustworthiness of looking towards the future while relying on past 
experiences.26 The third principle of influence, social proof, relates to Granovetter’s own 
discussion of how trust can be transmitted through our social networks;27 it refers to how 
actors often seek the opinions of those around them.28 This weapon of influence tethers 
trust and influence together well as an individual is more likely to trust those closest to 
them in their social network and therefore more likely to be influenced by their opinions. 
Closely related to social proof, the fourth principle—liking29—illustrates just how much 
of an impact the social network can have on an actor’s decisions and behaviors. As Cialdini 
clarifies in liking, familiarity through the regular interactions becomes the anchor to 
influencing an actor’s behaviors and preferences.30 Authority, the fifth principle, cites one 
of the most famous experiments in response to authority figures ever: Stanley Milgram’s 
“Obedience to Authority” experiments.31 Cialdini argues that individuals are conditioned 
from birth to obey rules and authority; hence it remains an weapon of influence throughout 
 
24 Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, Revised (New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 2007), xii. 
25 Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion; Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 15–56. 
26 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 146–158. 
27 Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” 1374. 
28 Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, 114–166. 
29 Cialdini, 167. 
30 Cialdini, 176. 
31 Cialdini, 208. 
10 
life. The final weapon of influence, according to Cialdini, is scarcity; this comes from the 
claim that there are limited quantities or availability of a commodity.32  
While Cialdini’s work remains the anchor in understanding influence for the U.S. 
Army—it continues to be the primary textbook for the Information Operations 
Qualification Course—there are other works on propaganda, information warfare, media, 
and even simple human agency that ought to be discussed here as well. Jacques Ellul’s 
work on propaganda, paired with his perspectives on technology, reached far into the future 
from the 1950s and 1960s, when he authored his works. Ellul argued that the prevalence 
of technology means that propaganda is irreversibly incorporated into our daily lives, 
regardless of deliberate intentions.33 He disagrees with those who contend that propaganda 
is “active power vs. passive masses” and instead contents that it only succeeds when it 
“corresponds to a need for propaganda on the individual’s part.”34 Furthermore, he argues 
that “the propagandee is by no means an innocent victim” in that “he provokes the 
psychological action of propaganda, and not merely lends himself to it, but even derives 
satisfaction from it.”35 Although Ellul spent his life railing against technology’s 
pervasiveness, his perspective acknowledges the role of human agency in the choices we 
make. His thoughts on propaganda serve to remind us that an individual’s own decision-
making often serves their own interests. 
In their book, The Age of Propaganda, Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson 
define propaganda as “the techniques of mass persuasion that have come to characterize 
our postindustrial society.” 36 Their work, like that of Ellul’s, argues that propaganda is not 
simply the tool of evil, but rather something that has come to be included in mass 
communication and operates as a lever for influence. Similar to Cialdini’s weapons of 
 
32 Cialdini, 239. 
33 Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formations of Men’s Attitudes (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 
1–257. 
34 Ellul, 121. 
35 Ellul, 121. 
36 Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of 
Persuasion, Revised (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002) , 11. 
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influence, they outline four means in which propaganda persuades: pre-persuasion, 
communicator credibility, the message and how it is delivered, and emotional appeals.37  
The subcategories offered in pre-persuasion include words of influence, or renaming 
something to lead an actor to believe it is something it is not and pictures in our heads, 
paired with the words of influence, allow mass media to create fictions people begin to 
believe as truths. Pratkanis and Aronson argue that the mass media cultivate stories which 
persist in the storytelling and our understanding of the world around us.38 The 
subcategories continue in each principle, but the primary argument circles around the same 
that Ellul made decades before: propaganda meets the needs of the actors it is designed to 
persuade, meaning that the actors themselves have agency in both the creation of 
propaganda and their acceptance of its messages. In the same vain, the U.S. military 
activities, or even those of China, explored later in this thesis, meet Kenya’s needs as well 
as their own. 
D. SUMMARY 
As this thesis explores, the social networks created through military and diplomatic 
engagements may be exploited to better influence partner nations; however, mapping the 
network and determining which of the tools of influence can be applied to which actors 
and ties should be implemented at the policy level. The relationships that both the U.S. and 
China have with Kenya illustrate the potential brokers and bridges, as well as other critical 
actors in the networks, to which these influence principles may be best applied. 
 
37 Pratkanis and Aronson, 71. 
38 Pratkanis and Aronson, 71. 
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III. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
This thesis focuses on the influence and power gained in establishing trust through 
relationships between military and diplomatic entities from the United States and Kenya, 
and China and Kenya. It seeks to use social network analysis (SNA) to better understand 
Kenya’s military and diplomatic social networks in order to better affect information 
operations implementation and planning. SNA envelops qualitative assessments of 
networks as well as quantitative metrics in order to provide a holistic approach to 
evaluating social networks. It draws on a wide range of theories from various social 
sciences, such as sociology, psychology, and political science, and then incorporates 
mathematical practices to measure the impacts of the network as a whole, the actors within 
the network, and the ties that bind them together. As Cunningham et al. write, SNA “is 
frequently confused with social networking and social media analysis” in that people often 
“hold the vague expectation that it has something to do with analyzing social media 
outlets.”39 However, while social media can provide data which can then be analyzed using 
SNA, the use of social media is only a recent development while SNA has existed for much 
longer, dating back to the early twentieth century.40 Literature explaining and exploring 
SNA ranges from mainstream and accessible works like Connected by Nicholas Christakis 
and James Fowler41 to the mathematical and academically focused works like Analyzing 
Social Networks by Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson.42 Here, I will draw on some of the 
more prominent and relevant works on SNA as they apply to this thesis while explaining 
both what SNA is and also how this thesis applies its methods to a network to demonstrate 
its validity in the practice of information operations. 
 
39 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for the 
Use of Social Network Analysis, 6. 
40 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 6. 
41 Nicholas A. Christakis and James H. Fowler, Connected: How Your Friends’ Friends’ Friends 
Affect Everything You Feel, Think, and Do (New York: Little, Brown Spark, 2009) 1–305. 
42 Stephen P. Borgatti, Martin G. Everett, and Jeffrey C. Johnson, Analyzing Social Networks, 2nd ed. 
(Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications Ltd., 2018), 1–347. 
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A. BASIC CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS OF SNA 
a. Social Network Analysis 
In the clearest and simplest terms, SNA is best defined as the theory and 
methodology applied to understanding the impacts of social networks on behavior.43 While 
it cannot predict human behaviors, it can assist in understanding how networks indicate 
why or how certain behaviors occur. 
b. Actor 
In SNA, an actor—also known as a node or a vertex—can be “individual 
people…groups, organizations, businesses, or even nonhuman entities such as websites, 
publications.”44 In this thesis, actors include organizations (large and small) classified by 
their attributes of civilian groups, civilian organizations, government organizations, and 
military organizations. 
c. Tie 
Ties or relations (sometimes referred to as edges or arcs) tether the actors together. 
They can “vary in terms of type, direction, and strength”45 and have characteristics of their 
own, like co-workers, married, friends, and a “multitude of other relational” possibilities.46 
d. Social Network 
Formally, a social network is a pattern of ties linking together a “finite set or sets 
of actors.”47 Informally, it is “a way of thinking about social systems that focus our 
attention on the relationships among entities that make up the system.”48  Christakis and 
 
43 Sean Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences 34 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 4. 
44 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for the 
Use of Social Network Analysis, 10. 
45 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 10. 
46 Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, Analyzing Social Networks, 2. 
47 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications 8 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 20. 
48 Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, Analyzing Social Networks, 2. 
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Fowler argue that social networks are “human superorganisms” that “grow and evolve” 
with their “own structure and a function.”49 Considering the dynamics of human 
interactions in this manner becomes necessary when, like in information operations and 
influence activities, we seek to affect a decision maker’s choices or influence the outcome 
of a communication. The networks in this thesis consider the diplomatic and military ties 
between the United States and Kenya, and Kenya and China. The data was collected 
through public websites and news articles and, therefore, certain information on the data 
was unknown. As such, the ties between actors are all assumed to be undirected or 
reciprocal.  
e. Attributes 
Borgatti et al. note that like ties, actors also “have characteristics—typically called 
‘attributes’—that distinguish among them, and these can be categorical traits… or 
continuous traits.”50 Attributes encompass any non-relational information about the actors; 
in the case of this thesis, they capture what kind of group each node is.  
f. Sociograms, Paths, and Walks 
Sociograms, or graphs, are the visual representations of social networks showing 
the locations of all the actors and the ties between them. As Prell explains, we can take a 
“walk” through the network and understand the “sequence of nodes, and where nodes and 
lines can occur more than once.”51 The “path” this walk follows exists where “no node and 
no line occurs more than once.”52 In understanding the basic graph or sociogram generated 
with the nodes and edges, the network can be visually represented to better realize the 
relationships it represents. The compiled network data, sociogram, and resulting metrics 
calculated encapsulate the basic functions of social network analysis.  
 
49 Christakis and Fowler, Connected: How Your Friends’ Friends’ Friends Affect Everything You 
Feel, Think, and Do, XVI. 
50 Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, Analyzing Social Networks, 2. 
51 Christina Prell, Social Network Analysis: History, Theory, & Methodology (Los Angeles, CA: Sage 
Publications Ltd., 2011), 12. 
52 Prell, 12. 
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g. Boundary 
One first needs to determine a network’s boundary—defining “what sorts of actors 
can be considered to be inside the network and which ones are outside my realm of 
interest.”53 One also needs to define which ties are relevant for a particular analysis. In 
terms of the latter, “an actor’s position in a network determines in part the constraints and 
opportunities that he or she will encounter, and therefore identifying that position is 
important for predicting actor outcomes such as performance, behavior or beliefs.”54  
B. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 
The basic assumptions listed encompass the general expectations or beliefs that 
those applying SNA hold; because SNA is an amalgamation of several fields of study and 
methods, these assumptions act as the elementary basis for SNA. The first assumption 
implies that an actor’s decisions are dependent on their network or the behavior of those 
around them.55 Christakis and Fowler highlight this assumption in their assertion that 
influence only reaches through three degrees of separation.56 Similar to the first 
assumption, the second asserts that the ties between the actors provide the conduits or line 
of communication which non-material goods, like information (or even misinformation) 
can be transmitted.57 The difference between the first two assumptions is that the first 
concerns actors while the second concerns ties; however, the basis for both remains that 
the network bears great impact on an individual actor’s decision-making. 
 
53 Prell, 10. 
54 Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, Analyzing Social Networks, 1. 
55 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 15. 
56 Christakis and Fowler, Connected: How Your Friends’ Friends’ Friends Affect Everything You 
Feel, Think, and Do, 172–209. 
57 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 18. 
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Table 1. SNA’s basic assumptions58 
# Assumption 
1. 
Actors, along with their actions and 
motivations, are interdependent, rather than 
independent, with other actors. 
2. 
Ties between actors function as conduits for the 
transfer or flow of information, sentiment, 
material and/or nonmaterial goods, or other 
resources (e.g., funds, supplies, information, 
trust, enmity) 
3. 
A network’s social structure reflects enduring 
patterns of interaction between actors.  
4. 
Repeated social interactions between actors 
give rise to social configurations that take on a 
life of their own and cannot be reduced to 
constituent components even though actors 
remain dependent upon those components. 
5. 
An Actor’s position in the social structure 
impacts his or her beliefs, norms, and behavior. 
6. 
Social networks are dynamic and responsive to 
changes in the actors, subgroups, and ties 
between actors.  
The third assumption listed asserts that the network is a structure, though not in a 
tangible sense, this structure or “enduring pattern of behavior and relationships” and the 
“social institutions and norms that have become embedded in social systems… can shape 
behavior.”59 The fourth holds that social networks can begin to act like a “living 
organism,” and the behaviors of the individual actors no longer entirely explain the 
58 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for the 
Use of Social Network Analysis, 13. 
59 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 21. 
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behavior of the overall network. Sean Everton best explained this phenomenon by likening 
this to water; “water cannot be reduced or explained entirely by its underlying atoms but is 
still dependent on them.”60 This suggests that each level of a network should be taken into 
consideration when crafting intervention strategies to either build up or disrupt a particular 
network.61 The next assumption logically follows that an actor’s decisions and beliefs are 
a function of their location in the social structure.62 For instance, “[i]ndividuals who are 
located socially proximate to a group are far more likely to join that group than are those 
who are socially distant.”63 The sixth and final assumption addresses the life of a social 
network: it is always evolving as actors join and leave and ties between form and 
dissolve.64 
C. TOPOGRAPHICAL TERMS AND MEASURES
a. Topography
The topography of the network refers to its overall structure.65 As discussed earlier, 
the position of the actors within the network and the ties all have impacts on the behaviors. 
There are numerous topographical measures which can assist in understanding a network’s 
structure and interpreting the observed behaviors of actors.  
(1) Density
Density measures the interconnectedness of the actors in the network and can 
indicate whether it is tightly knit or sparse. This measure calculates the “ratio of actual ties 
to possible ties.”66  
60 Everton, 23. 
61 Everton, 23. 
62 Everton, 24. 
63 Everton, 26. 
64 Everton, 27. 
65 Everton, 10. 
66 Everton, 11. 
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(2) Centralization
Centralization “measures the extent to which a network is centralized around a few 
actors.”67 The U.S.-Kenya-China networks examined in this thesis highlight the 
centralization of a very few actors.  
(3) Network size
Network size is a straight-forward metric, it is simply the number of actors within 
the network.68  
(4) Average distance
Average distance measures “the average length of all the shortest paths between all 
actors in a network.”69 Understanding a network’s average distance may help gauge the 
speed by which information or messages disseminate through a network.70 
(5) Broker
A broker is an actor that ties two or more groups together. 
(6) Bridges
A bridge is the relational tie that tethers two groups together. 
Perhaps one of the most influential works in the field of SNA is Mark Granovetter’s 
1973 article, “The Strength of Weak Ties,”71 in which he explores the impact and influence 
of ties between pairs of actors who seldom or rarely interact, which he calls weak ties.72 
He argues that weak ties are more likely to function as bridges that provide a singular link 
between two groups that would otherwise have no connections. In fact, he argues that while 
67 Everton, 11. 
68 Everton, 12. 
69 Everton, 137. 
70 Everton, 137. 
71 Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” 1365. 
72 He argues that “the strength of a tie is a combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, 
the intimacy, and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie.” See Granovetter, 1361. 
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not all weak ties are bridges, “all bridges are weak ties.”73 His work is particularly 
important to considering the United States’ relationships to Kenya by the nature of military 
and diplomatic interactions; the personnel within military units or diplomatic offices 
interacting with one another regularly change and, therefore, the weak ties (or bridges) help 
in disseminating sentiment and perceived trust over longer periods of time. Within these 
units and offices, it may be likely that only a few personnel engage with one another 
repeatedly and so, clearly, time, emotional intensity, and intimacy may all have varying 
degrees of success and importance to individuals within the organizations. As this thesis 
examines nodes only at the organizational level, the inference of weak ties among the few 
individuals that have repeated and long-term interactions shows, “in some detail, how the 
use of network analysis can relate this aspect to such varied macro phenomena as diffusion, 
social mobility, political organization, and social cohesion.”74 While SNA cannot supplant 
human agency in understanding the ultimate success in influence or entirely predict a 
person’s behavior, it can assist in understanding patterns and help planning engagements 
and interactions to be more impactful.  
(7) Subgroups
Within an overall network, subgroups or subnetworks often emerge. These 
subgroups are, as the name suggests, smaller cohesive groups within the overall network. 
In this thesis, the overall network established two distinct subgroups over the span of ten 
years, which are titled Military-to-Military (or Mil-Mil) and Diplomatic; within each of 
these subgroups there exist ties between U.S. and Kenya, and China and Kenya.  
(8) Community Detection and Modularity
Community detection algorithms are useful for detecting subgroups within the 
overall network. The degree to which it “succeeds” is captured by modularity, which is a 
metric that “compares the number of internal links in the groups to how many you would 
73 Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” 1364. 
74 Granovetter, 1361. 
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expect to see if they were distributed at random.”75 A higher  number indicates “more 
significant groupings.”76 In this thesis, community detection algorithms and modularity 
helps identifying subgroups that exist within the networks that are examined, which may 
indicate where influence will travel through the network, the potential expectation for the 
spread of information, and how many touchpoints a message may need to have before 
reaching full dissemination. 
D. CENTRALITY MEASURES
Centrality measures may be the most applied SNA metrics, reflecting the
assumption that some actors have more central positions in a network and, therefore, exert 
more influence.77 The centrality measures used in this thesis include degree, closeness 
betweenness and eigenvector (Table 2). Multiple centrality measures exist because there 
are different assumptions of what it means for an actor to be central.78 As Cunningham et 
al. explain, “This… makes it possible for analysts to select the version of centrality that 
best corresponds with what they are seeking to discover in a particular network.”79 This 
thesis uses two frequency-based measures that account for the number of each actor’s direct 
ties (degree centrality) and whether an actor’s ties are to other well-connected actors 
(eigenvector centrality).80 
The closeness centrality measure used in this thesis, average reciprocal distance 
(ARD), is appropriate for disconnected networks like those examined in Chapter IV 
because it treats the reciprocal of infinite distances as zero.81 Closeness centrality is 
75 Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, Analyzing Social Networks, 222. 
76 Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, 222. Normalized modularity, which takes into account the number 
of subgroups identified, “reduces bias and increases comparability,” 341. 
77 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for the 
Use of Social Network Analysis, 141. 
78 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 141. 
79 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 142. 
80 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 12–13. 
81 Stephen P. Borgatti. 2006. “Identifying Sets of Key Players in a Social Network.” Computational, 
Mathematical and Organizational Theory 12:21-34. 
22 
insightful because it helps determine which actors are in a position to exert influence in a 
network.82 Finally, betweenness centrality, the path-based measure applied in this thesis, 
considers “how often an actor lies on the shortest path between all pairs of other actors.”83 
Similar to  closeness centrality, it can potentially identify who in a network has the ability 
to exert substantial influence. It can also assist in detecting potential brokers that may be 
either be critical in maintaining relationships the U.S. values or those whose influence the 
U.S. would like to disrupt. 
Table 2. Centrality measures84 
Measure Definition 
Degree Centrality The count of an actor’s ties 
Closeness Centrality 
Measures how close, on 
average, each actor is to all 
other actors in a network 
Betweenness Centrality 
Measure the extent to which 
each actor lies on the 
shortest path between all 
other actors in a network 
Eigenvector Centrality 
Assumes ties to highly 
central actors are more 
important than ties to 
peripheral actors, so it 
weighs an actor’s total ties to 
other actors by their total ties 
82 Christakis and Fowler, Connected: How Your Friends’ Friends’ Friends Affect Everything You 
Feel, Think, and Do, 33–60. 
83 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for the 
Use of Social Network Analysis, 145. 
84 Everton, Sean, Disrupting Dark Networks. Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences, vol. 34. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
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The closeness centrality measure used in this thesis, average reciprocal distance 
(ARD), is appropriate for disconnected networks like those examined in Chapter IV 
because it treats the reciprocal of infinite distances as zero.85 Closeness centrality is 
insightful because it helps determine which actors are in a position to exert influence in a 
network.86 Finally, betweenness centrality, the path-based measure applied in this thesis, 
considers “how often an actor lies on the shortest path between all pairs of other actors.”87 
Similar to  closeness centrality, it can potentially identify who in a network has the ability 
to exert substantial influence. It can also assist in detecting potential brokers that may be 
either be critical in maintaining relationships the U.S. values or those whose influence the 
U.S. would like to disrupt. 
E. CONDITIONAL UNIFORM GRAPHS 
Finally, this thesis applies Conditional Uniform Graphs (CUGs) at the culmination 
of the fourth chapter. While the previous SNA metrics and algorithms used in this analysis 
offer discovery and description of the network and its subgroups, CUGs can lend additional 
insight into the analysis by offering statistical tests of the network structure.88 It can assist 
in determining whether or not there may have been biases in the data collection or process 
or whether an observed metric (e.g., centralization of the network) is greater or smaller 
than one  would expect in a random graph of the same size and/or density.89 In terms of 
the former, since the data was sourced from a limited number of sources, the networks 
analyzed here may not be wholly representative of Kenya’s actual military and diplomatic 
networks. In terms of the latter, CUGs can determine whether the centralization of Kenya’s 
military and diplomatic networks exhibit are substantially greater than one would normally 
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expect. Put differently, they can help ascertain whether the degree of centralization of the 
networks are statistically significant. 
F. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The basic concepts and assumptions in this chapter offer an elementary 
understanding of SNA as well as how they will each be applied in the following chapter. 
This chapter does not consider all possible SNA metrics and algorithms, but those 
discussed here will be used in the case study of Kenya’s military and diplomatic 
relationships with both the U.S. and China. The intent within this chapter, as well as the 
next, is to first explain the terms and assumptions of SNA and then illustrate how they can 
be applied by compiling real world data available through open-source information. The 
following analysis offers limited real-world data and assessments and potential 
applications to operations planning and implementation.  
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IV. MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN KENYA: 
INFLUENCES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 
The ties between the United States and Kenya began in the 1960s during Kenya’s 
transition to an independent state; however, the importance of this relationship reached 
critical mass in 1998 after the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi.90 The growing 
concerns that the Horn of Africa (HOA) provided an easily accessible route in and out of 
the Middle East for al-Qaeda operatives focused U.S. military efforts in Africa to its eastern 
region and Kenya became the “lynchpin” to combating terrorism in HOA.91 According to 
Prestholdt, “it has been the focus of security funding, targeted aid to Muslim communities, 
and direct military engagement, particularly in the field of military-provided development 
assistance.”92 In the wake of the U.S. response to 9/11, this support grew again in 2002 
after a series of attacks in Kenya and “American security aid and corresponding pressure 
to arrest terrorists” increased.93 Throughout the 2000s, “the U.S. approach to countering 
terrorism in Africa has been to forge counter-terrorism partnerships…with the aim of 
equipping them with the necessary tools to enhance their capacity to effectively combat 
terrorism.”94 The U.S. has worked with Kenya in “bolstering the capacity” of its “military 
and law enforcement agencies to conduct counter-terrorism operations.”95 
As the 2017 National Security Strategy has realigned the U.S. focus to consider 
China and Russia as greater threats, Kenya’s importance has not decreased; in fact, its 
position as a strategic focus may continue to grow as China’s involvement and influence 
in Africa increases. As Hunt Friend and Fanger highlight, “Africa is, once again, becoming 
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an arena for international competition.”96 While China has not partnered with Kenya 
through military means, like the U.S. continues to do, Chinese investments in Kenya, as 
well as its diplomatic ties, have grown considerably in the last decade. China’s foreign 
policy towards Africa focuses heavily on diplomatic engagements as “China has relied on 
their support at the United Nations for its political agenda” and the “African countries 
account for more than one-quarter of U.N. member states.”97 In 2019, Kenya received the 
majority of  the African Union’s votes, 37–13, over Djibouti for the upcoming non-
permanent member seat to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) which will be available in 
2021.98 As both China and the United States represent two of the five permanent members 
of the UNSC, strong diplomatic ties with all non-permanent members remains crucial. 
China prioritizes diplomatic ties with African nations through the Forum of China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC), with fifty-two of the fifty-four countries participating and while 
Kenya does not currently partner with China through military exercises, many surrounding 
regional partners, like Tanzania and Sudan, do.99 China’s interactions within Kenya 
remain consistent through a China Central Television (CCTV) headquarters in Nairobi and 
loans to both the government and state-owned businesses for infrastructure projects.100 
A. THE U.S. IN KENYA 
In the current political landscape, both domestically and internationally, the United 
States’ concern over a revitalization of “great power competition” or a new Cold War era, 
seems to dominate day-to-day discourse. September 11, 2001, and the subsequent Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) shocked the United States from the “fog of materialism and 
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disinterest and avoidance”101 of the 1990s and helped refocus American attention for the 
following twenty years. The GWOT developed deeper security partnerships with countries 
in Africa, like Kenya, that provided specific strategic advantages. Schraeder argues that 
“the triggering mechanism for sustained presidential attention to African issues is usually 
the occurrence of some type of intense politico-military conflict”102 or a crisis response. 
In the case of Kenya, the crisis response to the bombings of U.S. Embassies in 1998 appears 
to have created a path dependence on countering terrorism. That focused attention on 
GWOT, however, is again changing and, as Nye predicted in 2005, “the search for new 
state challengers is well under way.”103 
In 2012, the first U.S. Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa laid out the strategic 
priorities for the United States, listing four pillars: (1) Strengthen Democratic institutions, 
(2) spur economic growth, trade, and investment, (3) advance peace and security, and (4) 
promote opportunity and investment.104  These pillars, however, did not seem to mirror 
the actions on the ground in Kenya, where more than two decades of counter-terrorism 
trainings and exercises have been the prominent practice in military exchanges. In 2015, a 
Congressional Research Service report noted that Kenya was the number one recipient of 
“train-and-equip” monies for counter-terrorism assistance, which the report states equaled 
$188 million in a ten-year span.105  Assistance from the U.S. also includes monies from 
“Global Health Initiative, Feed the Future, Power Africa, and the Security Governance 
Initiative.”106 However, the democratic standing of Kenya has been called in to question 
many times since the 2010 elections and the aid has continued. The Millennium Challenge 
Corporation’s (MCC) scorecard for Kenya reflects positive results for human development 
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in the country, as well as political rights and government effectiveness.107 In fact, the area 
in which Kenya ranks lowest, government corruption, Kenya’s scores have degraded each 
year for the last five years. By MCC’s standards, Kenya’s health and education standards 
have improved, but those measures which signify economic improvement and 
development remain low. The U.S. pillars supporting democracy and economic growth 
have not been as fruitful in Kenya as military interaction and placement.  
In 2018, the Department of State published the most recent Integrated Country 
Strategy (ICS) for Kenya, which prioritizes advancing security and regional engagement 
as the first issue.108 According to the ICS, Kenya continues to be the largest U.S. mission 
in Africa and its emphasis on “Kenya’s ability to prevent and respond to crime and 
terrorism threats and mitigate threats to stability,” while specifying the role of defeating 
“al-Shabaab, ISIS, and other terrorist organizations” demonstrates little change from the 
previous U.S. foreign policy.109 The troubling lack of change in Kenya can be summed up 
through Allen’s criticism that quantitative analysis “found no relationship between security 
assistance and improvements in state fragility in Africa.”110  
B. CHINA IN KENYA 
Much of the concern over success of U.S. influence in Kenya focuses on the ever-
growing relationships between China and many African nations. As China’s influence on 
the continent grows, and its investments eclipse those of what the U.S. can offer in many 
sectors, proponents of the United States seek to understand what the U.S. can change to 
improve influence and foreign policy success. As Friend Hunt and Fanger noted, “although 
the NSS is right to note the frequent imbalance in benefits between African and Chinese 
interests, on average, 63 percent of Africans view Chinese economic and political influence 
 
107 “Kenya,” Millennium Challenge Corporation, accessed November 15, 2019, 
https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/country/kenya. 
108 Department of State, “Integrated Country Strategy: Kenya,” August 18, 2018. 
109 Department of State, 2. 
110 Nathaniel D.F. Allen, “Assessing a Decade of U.S. Military Strategy in Africa,” Foreign Policy 
Research Institute ORBIS 989 (August 2018): 11. 
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positively.”111  In fact, “straining to compete with China economically, while limiting 
security-related engagements to terrorist groups, is likely to cede the strategically important 
elements of Africa’s future to the very state adversaries both the NSS and the NDS seek to 
dominate.”112 
The Brookings Institute’s evaluation of China’s foreign policy towards Africa 
offers insights and projections for the future of China in Africa. Most poignantly, Sun notes 
the future potential issues that may arise for China as its interests and investments in Africa 
continue to grow, which they certainly will.113 China created the Forum of China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) to “coordinate its interaction with individual African countries”114 
and this will continue to guide China’s interactions for the future, providing insight and 
collaboration where needed. Additionally, China has been one of the largest suppliers of 
military equipment to many other African nations, and while that interaction has not 
necessarily been in Kenya, there exist a multitude of interactions between China and other 
regional partners in Sub-Saharan Africa.115 
C. DATA AND METHODS 
In developing the military network, I built a dataset using open-source publications 
describing a variety of security cooperation and partnership building interactions from the 
United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) Public Affairs Office (PAO) and from the 
Embassy of China in Kenya.116 I then constructed a similar dataset for the diplomatic 
relational ties  using open-source publications of the AFRICOM PAO, the Embassy of 
 
111 Hunt Friend and Fanger, “U.S. National Security and Defense Goals in Africa: A Curious 
Disconnect,” 3.  
112 Hunt Friend and Fanger, 3. 
113 Sun, “Africa in China’s Foreign Policy,” 30. 
114 Eisenman and Shinn, “China and Africa,” 844. 
115 Eisenman and Shinn, 845. 
116 “United States Africa Command,” United States Africa Command, accessed October 16, 2019, 
https://www.africom.mil/Search?query=Kenya; “Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the 
Republic of Kenya,” China-Kenya Relationship, accessed October 16, 2019, http://ke.china-embassy.org/
eng/zkgx/default_2.htm. 
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China in Kenya, and the United States Embassy in Kenya.117 These sources were used 
because they are designed to promote the military and diplomatic initiatives and 
interactions the United States and China have with Kenya. As such, they provide an open-
source perspective of how the United States and China view their own influence and what 
each state considers as important interactions that support their own strategic foreign policy 
with Kenya.  
The resulting dataset includes reports between 2009 and 2019 that specify 
cooperative military engagement, military engagement with civilians, and diplomatic 
interactions—the relationships—between the United States and China with Kenya. The 
chosen ten-year timeframe consists of when the United States transitioned from a 
heightened military presence in Iraq in 2008 towards the “Pivot to the Pacific” in 2011, 
and currently, into an era of great power competition.118 Thus, the resulting social network 
is composed of three major periods which showcase changes in U.S. strategic policy and 
how that may affect the measure of influence in Kenya in relation with China through 
longitudinal analysis.  
a. Relational ties 
(1) Military-to-Military Engagements: Interactions between two or more 
military units from two or more states. Combined with following network. 
(2) Military-to-Civilian Engagements: Interactions between a military unit 
from one state and a civilian group from another state. Combined with 
previous network. 
(3) Diplomatic Engagements: Interactions between a senior politician or 
diplomat from one state with a politician, diplomat, civilian group, or 
military unit from another state. 
 
 
117 U.S. Embassy in Kenya, “United States Embassy in Kenya,” News and Events (blog), n.d., 
https://ke.usembassy.gov/. 
118 Nicholas J. Schlosser, The Surge 2007–2008, The U.S. Army Campaigns in Iraq (Washington, 
D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 2017), 1–96, https://history.army.mil/html/books/
078/78-1/cmhPub_078-1.pdf; Mark E. Manyin, “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s 
‘Rebalancing’ Toward Asia,” Congressional Research Service, March 28, 2012, 1–29. 
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b. Attributes 
(1) Civilian Organization: Non-governmental organizations, either for profit or 
non-profit, organized at a local, national, or international level.  
(2) Civilian Group: Unofficial: A group of non-affiliated civilians. This 
attribute includes members of any population interacting with official 
government or military organizations. 
(3) Government Organization: An official organization created and run by a 
states’ government for the purposes of enacting or instituting functions of 
that government. Members of these organizations are civilian government 
employees.  
(4) Military Organization: An official military or armed force. The members 
are officers or enlisted soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines.  
 
When possible, the actors of the network were specifically identified. However, in 
many instances, I could only address the overarching organization, particularly among 
military relationships. For example, some interactions simply state the Kenya Defense 
Forces (the overarching organization) and others that provide more specific information, 
e.g., the 18th Chinese Brigade. As such, some SNA measurements will likely reflect a bias 
towards the overarching organizations and will require careful interpretation. However, in 
evaluating strategic United States and Chinese influence in Kenya, such bias may be less 
consequential because an interaction with a particular command within the Kenyan 
Defense Force may be viewed as an extension of an interaction with the overarching 
Kenyan Defense Forces. In other words, “the creation of exchange relations could…be a 
function of other relations in the network” which suggests an interaction with one Kenyan 
Defense Force entity may be a result of an interaction with the overarching Kenyan Defense 
Force organization.119 Therefore, the interaction among two entities could be derived from 
the influence and interaction with other “third party” entities within the network. The 
following two figures (Figures 1 and 2) graphically depict these networks.  
 
119 Peter R. Monge and Noshir S. Contractor, Theories of Communication Networks (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 211. 
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Figure 1. Military-to-Military and Civilian-to-Military engagements  
 
Figure 2. Diplomatic engagements. 
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D. METRICS AND ALGORITHMS 
The metrics and algorithms chosen to analyze this data provide insight into the 
topography of the overall network as well as the two subgroups of military and diplomatic 
networks. Topographical metrics capture the overall structure of a network. Density can 
help in understanding the efficacy of focusing influence efforts on a particular subgroup 
within a network; a denser network spreads messages and influence faster, encouraging 
more homophily in decision-making, whereas a sparser network may be more difficult to 
transmit messages through. Average degree and centralization each also assist in 
understanding the dynamics of the network overall, potentially guiding decisions and focus 
on how to build trust or enhance our own trustworthiness image in a network.  
Degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality comprise the node-level 
metrics that look at the impact individual actors may have within the overall network as 
well as the two smaller subgroups. Because this network is disconnected, the thesis uses 
harmonic centrality (also known as average reciprocal distance) for closeness centrality 
algorithm because it adequately accounts infinite distances.120 Closeness centrality assists 
in understanding an actor’s ties to other actors and how well they may or may not 
disseminate and receive information; the higher the score, the closer (more central) the 
actor is to all other actors.121  Betweenness centrality measures the “how often a given 
node falls along the shortest path between two other nodes.”122 It can help illuminate who 
in a network has higher potential for brokerage. Eigenvector centrality considers the 
centrality of the of those actors it is directly tied to, or as Borgatti et al. define it: “each 
node’s centrality is proportional to the sum of the centralities of the nodes it is adjacent 
to.”123 It indicates who in a network may have relationships with powerful actors. In effect, 
 
120 See Jorge Gil-Mendieta and Samuel Schmidt, The Origin of the Mexican Network of Power, 
Proceedings of the International Social Network Conference (Charleston, SC, 1996); Massimo Marchiori 
and Vito Latora, “Harmony in a Small-World,” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications 285, 
no. 3 (2000): 539–46; Stephen P. Borgatti, “Identifying Sets of Key Players in a Social Network,” 
Computational, Mathematical and Organizational Theory 12 (2006): 21–34. 
121 Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, Analyzing Social Networks, 199. 
122 Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, 201. 
123 Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, 194. 
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it captures the extent of how much of an actor’s impact on the network has to do with the 
relative impact of that actor’s immediate ties. The simplest of all measures, degree, is 
simply the sum of an actor’s ties.  
The final algorithm applied to these networks, conditional uniform graphs (CUGs), 
can assist in determining (1) whether or not there may have been biases in the data 
collection or process, and (2) if the networks’ observed level of centralization can be 
explained solely in terms of random processes.124 As already noted, the data was sourced 
from a limited set of sources and may not be wholly representative of the true network. 
That said, it may also indicate if the centralization of Kenya’s military and diplomatic 
networks is statistically significant.125 If so, this could offer valuable insights into crafting 
strategies for how to engage these networks in the future. 
E. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
After compilation of available open-source information on the military and 
diplomatic engagements between both the United States and China with Kenya, I then 
conducted analysis of the topographical results of the network. Table 3 displays the results 
for each of the topographical and centralization measures. This smaller network, consisting 
of only 161 actors, scores low in terms of density indicating that it is a relatively sparse 
network. The centralization scores, and in particular eigenvector centralization, suggest 
that although this network may be sparse, one or a handful of actors may possess significant 
and potential indirect influence in Kenya. 
To explore this apparent centralization further, I evaluated the centrality of the 
actors in the overall network. Figures 3–4 present the results for centrality measures. The 
results yield expected and unexpected results in both betweenness and eigenvector. The 
centrality of the Kenyan Defence Forces, USAFRICOM, and the Office of President 
Kenyatta represent is unexpected since all three are significant military or governmental 
actors. As discussed earlier, the overarching military organizations, USAFRICOM and 
 
124 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for 
the Use of Social Network Analysis, 235. 
125 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, 235. 
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Kenya Defence Forces, appear often in lieu of smaller, more specific unit identifications. I 
determined this inconsequential in understanding the patterns of the relationships between 
military units. 




Average Path Length 4.796 
Density 0.027 
Average Degree 4.422 
Degree Centralization 0.294 
Betweenness Centralization 0.388 
Eigenvector Centralization 0.812 
Closeness Centralization 0.366 
 
The actors whose betweenness centrality measure do present potential brokerage 
opportunities prove to be interesting. For example, Kenyan Journalists appear to possess 
significant potential. Additionally, the higher eigenvector and betweenness centrality 
measures for Ambassador Wu Peng, the People’s Liberation Army, and the Uganda 
Military illuminate the substantial ties between Kenya and China, as well as Kenya and its 
regional partners. The closeness centrality measure provides exceptional insight into the 
overall network. While the top two scores belong to the expected actors, Kenya Defence 
Forces and USAFRICOM, the subsequent scores reveal that some unexpected actors could 
be pivotal in interactions and the flow of communications within this network. Again, 
Kenyan Journalists score high, and the Kenya Editor’s Guild (KEG) ranks in the top ten, 
suggesting that the influence the media wields, even within the military’s engagements, 
may have great impact (refer to Appendices A and B for further information in the KEG).  
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Figure 4. Eigenvector and degree centrality measures for entire network. 
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F. MILITARY NETWORK
Next, I examined the topographical and centrality metrics of the military relations,
which includes both military to military ties, as well as military to civilian ties. The 
topography measures (Table 4) indicate a small (80 actors), sparse network. Most of the 
centrality measures suggest that implementation of an information operation or directed 
communication strategy within this network would likely require multiple touchpoints in 
order to reach all intended targets because “the information being transmitted must make 
lots of little hops through different clusters and so may take a long time to travel from one 
side of the network to the other.”126  Eigenvector centralization, however, does suggest 
there may be a few brokers to focus upon.  




Average Path Length 3.843 
Density 0.016 
Average Degree 2.534 
Degree Centralization 0.307 
Betweenness Centralization 0.135 
Eigenvector Centralization 0.819 
Closeness Centralization 0.398 
Figures 5–6 provide the results of the centrality measures on the military relations. 
These reinforce the previous whole-network metrics of the ties between Kenya and the 
126 Anne Collar, “Re-Thinking Jewish Ethnicity through Social Network Analysis,” in Network 
Analysis in Archeology: New Approaches to Regional Interaction, ed. C. Knappett (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 225. 
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U.S. military, China, and regional partners. Once again, the eigenvector centrality scores 
indicate a few nodes may serve as power brokers for the rest of the network. Additionally, 
the sparseness (low density) and relatively low centralization scores suggests that 
information flow may be inefficient,127 interactions irregular, and opportunities to disrupt 
or alter the relational ties exist. The presence of the regional partner militaries of Uganda, 
Burundi, Djibouti, and Tanzania in the top ten rankings in the centrality measures indicate 
the importance of neighboring countries. The PLA’s placement within the top scores on 
the military networks may also indicate China’s growing ability to influence through 
military engagements in the region.  
 
Figure 5. Closeness and betweenness centrality measures for Military 
subgroup. 
 
127 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for 
the Use of Social Network Analysis, 226. 
39 
 
Figure 6. Eigenvector and degree centrality measures for the Military 
subgroup. 
G. DIPLOMATIC NETWORK 
The diplomatic network also provides insight into Kenya’s relational ties between 
the U.S. and China. While the military ties prove to be closer to regional partners and the 
United States, the diplomatic interactions show very different results. As itemized in Table 
5, the diplomatic network numbers only slightly larger than the military network, with 105 
actors. It also proves to be sparse, small, and except for eigenvector centralization, low to 
moderately centralized. There is, however, a number of Chinese actors who rank high in 
terms of all four centrality measures. For example, Figure 8 indicates that the Chinese 
Ambassador to Kenya scores second highest in terms of eigenvector centrality. The 








Average Path Length 3.030 
Density 0.012 
Average Degree 1.888 
Degree Centralization 0.172 
Betweenness Centralization 0.068 
Eigenvector Centralization 0.809 
Closeness Centralization 0.346 
 
 




Figure 8. Eigenvector and degree centrality measures for Diplomatic 
subgroup. 
H. SUBGROUP ANALYSIS 
Within each of the two networks, military and diplomatic, exist a number of smaller 
groups which may provide further details to the brokers and bridges between these groups. 
Tables 6 through 8 and Figures 9 through 11 depict the subgroups using the Girvan-
Newman community detection algorithm,128 with convex hulls in Figures 9 through 11 to 
highlight the identities of each smaller group. This illustration explains the presence of a 
number of isolated dyadic relationships within the larger network. These also show the 
nine larger modular groups intermingled among and between the larger identified 
subgroups.  
1. Overall Network 
The metrics in Table 6 illustrate the sparseness of the overall network. Figure 9 
highlights the number of disconnected dyads and triads on the periphery of the network. 
 
128 Michelle Girvan and Mark E. J. Newman. 2002. “Community Structure in Social and Biological 
Networks.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) USA 99(12):7821-26. 
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While there are scholars who argue that influence can occur from the periphery and work 
its way inwards,129 the traditional expectation relies on the denser, smaller clusters in the 
center of the network for the diffusion of ideas.130 The smaller dyads and triads on the 
periphery may still have a purpose for information operations planning, dependent upon 
the desired effect.  
Table 6. Subgroups for entire network. 
Measures Scores 
Number of Groups 23 
Modularity 0.771 
Normalized Modularity 0.806 
 
 
Figure 9. Diplomatic and military relations subgroups. 
 
129 Navid Hassanpour, Leading from the Periphery and Network Collective Action (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1–216, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316493403. 
130 Everett M. Rogers, The Diffusion of Innovations, 5th ed. (New York: Free Press, 2003), 1–543. 
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2. Military Network 
Table 7 and Figure 10 present the metrics and sociogram for the military network 
broken down by subgroups. Again, the military relational ties have among them dyads and 
triads, the preponderance of relational ties remain within the larger subgroup.  
Table 7. Military relations subgroups. 
Measures Scores 
Number of Groups 94 
Modularity 0.669 
Normalized Modularity 0.779 
 
 
Figure 10. Military relations subgroups 
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3. Diplomatic Network 
Table 8 and Figure 11, however, demonstrate that the diplomatic relational ties 
include smaller, more isolated subgroups with less interconnectedness. The diplomatic 
network includes fewer subgroups than the military network and scores higher in terms of 
modularity. The difference in modularity between the two networks suggests very different 
opportunities and availability for disruption and intervention within each. The transfer of 
information or communications through this network would likely take longer but could 
also be focused on the more isolated dyads and triads.  
Table 8. Diplomatic subgroups. 
Measure Scores 
Number of Groups 74 
Modularity 0.794 
Normalized Modularity 0.782 
 
 
Figure 11. Diplomatic subgroups. 
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I. TEMPORAL ANALYSIS 
As discussed earlier, the data spans a decade of interactions for both networks and 
envelops multiple administrations in all three countries covered in these topics. The 
analysis, therefore, necessarily needs to examine how changes occurred through time and 
what trends they could potentially highlight. I broke the analysis down into two five-year 
periods for each network as well as for the overall network, calculating topographical and 
centrality metrics for each time period and network. 
 




Figure 13. Eigenvector and degree centrality measures, overall network, 
2009–2014. 
1. Overall Network 
The centrality scores for the first five years (2009-2014) for the overall network—
as presented in Figures 14 and 15—illustrate the prominence of the U.S. military (e.g., 
USAFRICOM) in terms of its engagement with Kenya Defence Forces. Military actors 
consistently score higher in terms of centrality than the diplomatic actors. The scores from 
the second time period (2015 to present) however, suggest that diplomatic actors are 
becoming increasingly central: both the Chinese Ambassador and President Kenyatta 
became more prominent in the network, as a comparison of the degree centrality scores in 
Figures 13 and 15 illustrate. The most significant changes between the two time periods, 
however, become even more apparent when examining the two diplomatic and military 
networks separately. We turn to those next.  
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Figure 15. Eigenvector and degree centrality measures, 2015–2019, overall 
network. 
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2. Military Network 
The military network through the first time period, as illustrated in Figure 16, again 
shows that the Kenya Defence Forces rank first in all four centrality measures. The time 
period from 2009–2014, captures the concentrated efforts to focus military interactions first 
with Kenya Defence Forces, with regional partner nations represented as well. The second 
time period reflects the changes which occurred from 2015–2019. Most significant, the 
Kenya Defence Forces betweenness score drops to an almost inscrutable number, 
nominally higher than USAFRICOM’s. Additionally, the top ten scores for all four 
centrality measures illustrate the emphasis on relationships with military medical 
personnel. The Kenya Defence Forces eigenvector and degree centrality scores do not rank 
in the top ten in the second time period, suggesting there might have been a drop in strict 
military engagements and a corresponding increase in military engagements that focus 
more on medical training and local populations, as reflected by the fact that villages appear 
in the top-ten rankings for all four centrality measures. 
 








Figure 18. Closeness and betweenness centrality measures, military network, 
2015–2019. 
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3. Diplomatic Network 
The diplomatic network provides insight through the changes incurred during the 
ten-year period as well. Figures 19 and 20 present the centrality measures. For diplomatic 
ties, the prominent actors in the first time period represent a focus on medical training with 
Kenya Ministry of Health and International Medical Corps (IMC) topping both lists, the 
IMC ranking first in both eigenvector and degree. Because much of the focus of 
interactions in Africa by the United States over the last 30 years has been on medical 
responses,131 from a foreign policy perspective this analysis fits the narrative for U.S. 
concerns in Africa. USAFRICOM, U.S. Civil Affairs units, and U.S. military Functional 
Teams also rank on the top ten for betweenness and degree in the diplomatic ties. While 
this could appear to be an example of mission creep, U.S. military activities in Africa have 
consistently been an extension of diplomatic engagements.132 
 
131 Lauren Ploch Blanchard, “Kenya: Current Issues and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research 
Service, February 26, 2013, www.crs.gov. 
132 Andrea Kathryn Talentino, “The Military’s Role in Development,” in The U.S. Military in Africa: 
Enhancing Security and Development?, ed. Jessica Piombo (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2015), 11–35. 
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Figure 20. Eigenvector and degree centrality measures, diplomatic network, 
2009–2014. 
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The diplomatic centrality metrics from the second time period (2015-2019) 
illustrate the most significant change in this series of analytics and validate the discussion 
of competition for influence in Kenya. As captured by Figure 21, the Chinese Ambassador 
ranks first in terms of betweenness and degree centrality and second in eigenvector, just 
below Kenya’s President Kenyatta. The eigenvector scores of both the ambassador and 
president are nearly twice that of the U.S. Ambassador for the same metric. The U.S. 
Ambassadors do rank in the top five on all four metrics, and U.S. Ambassador Godec’s 
(2015-2017) betweenness score equals that of the Chinese Ambassador. The rise in China’s 
diplomatic efforts, however, could indicate a shift in focus for Chinese efforts in Kenya, 
from financial and economic efforts based on the Belt and Road Initiative, to ones more 
politically focused between diplomacy and personal relationships. 
 




Figure 22. Eigenvector and degree centrality measures, diplomatic network, 
2015–2019. 
4. Conditional Uniform Graphs (CUGs) 
Due to the nature of both the collection of the data through open-source public 
affairs and public relations webpages and the concentration on military and diplomatic ties, 
I sought to also explore whether any research biases could be present, as well as test if the 
observed centralization levels are strictly due to random processes. In particular, I used 
Conditional Uniform Graphs (CUGs) to test the “structural characteristics” of the network. 
CUGs test whether “some measure of a given network against that same measure in a series 
of randomly generated networks that share some substantive property in common with the 
original.”133 If the observed centralization measures differ significantly from those found 
in randomly generated networks, then this could suggest a bias in data collection or that 
the observed centralization measures are telling us something significant about Kenya’s 
military and diplomatic networks.  
 
133 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks: A Strategic Framework for 
the Use of Social Network Analysis, 236. 
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Tables 9 and 10, along with Figures 23 and 24, present the results of the analysis. 
They suggest that if the collected network data reasonably capture Kenya’s military and 
diplomatic networks, then the observed centralization levels are higher than one would 
normally expect. Put differently, although the networks do not appear overly centralized, 
they are more centralized than one might reasonably expect them to be. Of course, this is 
contingent on whether the analyzed networks do reasonably capture Kenya’s military and 
diplomatic networks. If they do not, these results suggest that a bias was present in the data 
collection efforts, and so we should consider all results tentatively and regard any and all 
policy recommendations cautiously. 











Degree 0.60 1 0 0.60 1 0 
Betweenness 0.55 1 0 0.55 1 0 
Closeness .004 1 0 .004 1 0 
Eigenvector 0.55 1 0 0.55 1 0 
 











Degree 0.26 1 0 0.26 1 0 
Betweenness 0.16 0.996 0 0.16 1 0 
Closeness .002 1 0 .002 1 0 
Eigenvector 0.55 1 0 0.55 1 0 
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Figure 23. Military relations CUG test results. 
 
Figure 24. Diplomatic relations CUG test results. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The United States and Kenya have enjoyed a long-standing relationship with strong 
ties developed through years of military interactions which have benefited both countries; 
although the benefits are not determined through distinct measures,134 the persistent 
engagement patterns suggest future opportunities will continue. The U.S., however, should 
be mindful of the potential gap that could arise between the U.S.’s and Kenya’s goals, as 
China’s investments and military engagements in the region continue to grow. Change does 
not necessarily need to happen now, but the path dependence of military engagements in 
the country should not be taken for granted. China provides Kenya with opportunities for 
diversification and change, and the U.S. must be cognizant and ready to adjust as needed. 
This thesis has sought to address trust, trustworthiness, and influence and how each 
can be impacted within a social network through the case study of Kenya’s military and 
diplomatic ties with both the U.S. and China. Its social network analysis of these ties 
suggests that within the military network, the U.S. to Kenya ties and subgroups may 
provide more opportunities for continued engagement and trust-building. This does not, 
however, negate the growing Chinese interactions with Kenya and their growing 
diplomatic ties. The analysis did indicate China’s engagements throughout the two five-
year periods increased and although this thesis does not propose specific actions or effects 
for information operations, the purpose was to illuminate the tools SNA offers in 
understanding where ties exist and how those ties and actors may be affected by the 
surrounding network.  
The analysis offered in this thesis does not offer a holistic view at the case study 
networks as there are limitations to the data considered. The limited discussion of Kenya’s 
history and relationships to former colonial powers provides little development of the 
understanding in how the network has developed over the last fifty years and how that 
history may have created the networks in place currently. A longitudinal study including 
the progress of Kenya’s ties to colonial powers and regional partners would provide a 
 
134 Allen, “Assessing a Decade of U.S. Military Strategy in Africa,” 1–15.  
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deeper understanding and analysis. Because of the strict use of a limited list of open-source 
data, the networks analyzed here do not capture any ties to European countries and partners, 
which may skew the analysis such that some actors have less influence than they appear to 
have. The reverse could also be true. Some actors may have more influence than they 
appear to have in this analysis. Nevertheless, this case study does provide an example of 
how network data can be accumulated from open-source material and offers, at least a 
basic, understanding of the dynamic nature of networks and how they can assist in planning 
military operations.  
The overall implications for operations appear to include two potential avenues for 
approach. First, the military subgroup analysis indicates that interaction with the Kenyan 
Defence Forces as well as incorporating the regional partners, or even isolated interactions 
with regional partners, may strengthen influence potential for the U.S. in Kenya. As the 
network’s most central actor, the Kenyan Defence Forces’ strong relational ties to the U.S. 
military, as well as to regional partners, indicate that protecting these relational ties remains 
key in protecting U.S. interests.  
However, the analysis of the diplomatic network appears to have captured an 
increased influence of Chinese actors. While U.S. diplomats and politicians continue to 
engage and maintain interactions, the strength of ties and number of interactions and actors 
from China suggest that the diplomatic network may be where a disruption tactic should 
be applied. The continued overlap between the two networks indicates that addressing the 
activity of one while not addressing the other would not garner success in growing U.S. 
influence within relationships with Kenya and denying Chinese influence.  
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APPENDIX A. THE MEDIA IN KENYA 
As research for this thesis was being conducted, it became clear that Kenya’s media 
had become a focal point for attempts at Chinese influence. This appendix examines the 
ties between various media outlets, their owners and shareholders, and other key players. 
The data analyzed here are multi-modal (i.e., more than two types of actors) with ties within 
and between types of actors, so most standard social network metrics are not applicable. 
Nevertheless, the examination of key network diagrams can still highlight some interesting 
dynamics. The meta-network analysis tool, Organizational Risk Analysis (ORA),135 is 
used here because it is designed to handle such data.  
A. THE MEDIA IN KENYA 
In the analysis of Kenya’s military and diplomatic networks we saw that the media, 
and specifically the Kenyan Editor’s Guild, appeared to lie in a position of brokerage. Here 
we take a closer look at Kenya’s media network and what insights SNA can provide for 
understanding how to best move forward in building U.S. influence, or mitigating China’s. 
Since its independence in the 1960s, Kenya’s media has been entangled in the government 
structure, regularly criticized as biased and partisan, accused of being either too dependent 
on government support or controlled outright through government cooption.136 As 
“control over the production and distribution of ideas ensures cultural and therefore 
ideological domination by those who own the means of production,” government 
involvement and ownership of the media directly impact the information circulating 
throughout the country and among the population.137 The concerns, therefore, arise of 
“increasing corporatization of the media sector, including media concentration and 
conglomeration,” within Kenya.138  In this section, we seek to discern the aggregation of 
 
135 Kathleen M. Carley, ORA, version 2.3.6 (Carnegie Mellon University: Center for Computational 
Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS), 2001). 
136 George Ogola, “The Political Economy of the Media in Kenya: From Kenyatta’s Nation-Building 
Press to Kibaki’s Local-Language FM Radio,” Africa Today 57, no. 3 (Spring 2011): 77–95. 
137 Ogola, 78. 
138 Ogola, 78. 
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national media outlets in Kenya and, through social network analysis identify possible 
indications of the concentration of media outlets and ties between the owners.  
Kenya’s media has been entangled with the government since before its 
independence in 1963, with two of its newspapers having survived: The Daily Nation and 
The East African Standard (now known as The Standard), which remain two of the most 
prominent media outlets in the country.139 The stories of each newspaper differ greatly but 
not in the methods they employed to survive poor economic climates and tumultuous 
political environments.140  While Kenya’s media story is similar to most African countries 
throughout independence, “the Kenyan situation reflects a failure to involve the masses in 
decision-making processes, problems of legislative melee, problems of window dressing, 
and policy vacuum among others.”141  The practice of “developmental journalism”142 
fostered climates where the government administrations pressured the media to support 
and tell good news stories in order to facilitate and encourage growth and prosperity.  
Kenya is largely “regarded as having a well-developed and fast-growing media 
industry” throughout Africa and has been “pluralist since the early 1990s” with a less 
oppressive government than many of its neighbors.143  Kenyan journalists, however, still 
struggle with pressure to act as “instruments of partisan politics or inciting ethnic 
violence,” and although a media law was passed in 2009, libel laws continue to frustrate 
true freedom of press.144 Ultimately, Kenyan journalists remain conflicted, trying to 
survive in difficult economic times while not becoming an enemy of the state.145 The 
 
139 Ogola, “The Political Economy of the Media in Kenya: From Kenyatta’s Nation-Building Press to 
Kibaki’s Local-Language FM Radio,” 78. 
140 Ogola, 79. 
141 Sharon Adetutu Omotoso, “Media, Society, and the Postcolonial State,” in The Palgrave 
Handbook of African Colonial and Postcolonial History, ed. Martin S. Shanguhyia and Toyin Falola, vol. 2 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 1294. 
142 Ogola, “The Political Economy of the Media in Kenya: From Kenyatta’s Nation-Building Press to 
Kibaki’s Local-Language FM Radio,” 78. 
143 Elisabet Helander, “A Critical View of the Kenyan Media System Through the Perspective of the 
Journalists,” African Communication Research 3, no. 3 (2010): 522. 
144 Helander, 522. 
145 Helander, “A Critical View of the Kenyan Media System Through the Perspective of the 
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persistent presence of government oversight, contradictory or ambiguous legal guidelines, 
and lack of a robust economy make it difficult for honest reporting to exist. 
While significant issues lie with governmental control and its long-term 
entanglement of media ownership, governmental oversight, and oppressive regime 
practices, external factors present a real concern for U.S. influence within the country. 
While the majority of owners the media outlets in Kenya originate from other countries, 
many are European allies of the U.S. or regional partners on the African continent. The 
outlier of these external influences is China. China does not own any Kenyan media outlets, 
but it did establish a CCTV Africa headquartered in Nairobi in 2012, which provides 
mobile TV service entitled “I Love Africa” and reaches seventeen million Kenyan 
cellphones.146 This service does not transmit as Kenyan media outlets traditionally do but 
is instead designed to compete with other international outlets such as CNN and BBC.147 
Also, in 2012 China began a print magazine, China Daily, which is also headquartered and 
printed in Nairobi, and which Kenya Airways distributes on its flights.148 None of these 
actions are surprising; China’s policy towards Africa is not a secret nor are the agreements 
during the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) every three years.  
During the 2006 FOCAC, China outlined a “intervention” plan to the African 
nations that included five points:149 “increased contact between news media,” “multi-level 
exchanges and co-operation, with international visits and exchanges between media 
groups,” and “improvement of telecommunications infrastructure in African countries.”150 
These should concern Western agents for a multitude of reasons, not least of which that 
“media training is not value-neutral; it also carries with it the cultural and political values 
associated with the acquisition of those skills.”151 While the U.S. and its allies assert that 
 
146 Michael Leslie, “The Dragon Shapes Its Image: A Study of Chinese Media Influence Strategies in 
Africa,” African Studies Quarterly 16, no. 3–4 (December 2016), 161–174. 
147 Leslie, 165. 
148 Leslie, 165. 
149 Leslie, 163. 
150 Leslie, 163. 
151 Leslie, 164. 
62 
freedom of the press encourages truth in democracy and transparency to a population, the 
state-run Chinese media do not practice the same style of journalism. The entrenchment of 
the already oppressed Kenyan media now being indoctrinated to believe journalists work 
for the state could only amplify an already corrupt system.  
China is not the sole competitor for influence in Kenya; there are a variety of 
independent and state actors involved in the media industry. Lukoil, a large Russian oil 
company, owns SNG Holdings Limited, which owns The Standard although little insight 
or examination exists on Russian presence there. The United Kingdom’s legacy remains as 
the former colonial ties still tether Kenyan practices; however, the deliberate efforts from 
the U.K. do not conflict with U.S. interests in the region. Kenya, in fact, garners support 
and interest from multiple countries as the prominent economy and force provider in 
Eastern Africa, but the steadfast and methodical Chinese practices raise the most concern 
for U.S. influence interests.  
B. DATA AND METHODS 
I examined media outlets within the geographic boundaries of the country. Some 
media outlets that originate from outside of Kenya (e.g., Google) still serve as top sources 
of information for the Kenyan population. The data were drawn from an open-source 
search using Google and Lexis Advance, focusing on outlets recognized as national-level 
entities. I then used the list of outlets to gather further information on ties between them, 
their owners, parent companies, and the primary shareholders of these parent companies. 
Additionally, given the link that the Kenyan Editor’s Guild (KEG) provides between media 
outlets in the country, data on its members and their ties to the Kenyan Media network 
were also included and gathered directly from its website. Figure 25 presents the Kenya 
Media network. It includes 111 actors, but as the figure makes clear, it is largely 
disconnected. This could be due to missing data, but it may indicate that the network 




Figure 25. Kenya Media network. 
 
Figure 26. Small component illustrating President Kenyatta’s brokerage 
position.  
Figure 26 presents one of the larger components of the network,152 color coded by 
node type. It shows that President Kenyatta serves as a broker between the Kenyan 
government’s various media holdings and his privately-owned media outlets. In particular, 
he functions as a broker between the Kenyan government and Media Max Limited, which 
 
152 In a component all nodes (actors) can reach one another either directly or indirectly. 
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President Kenyatta owns. Comparing this component with Girvan-Newman clusters, 
which are summarized in Table 11, we can see that Girvan-Newman partitions the 
component into two smaller subnetworks (groups 2 and 4 in Table 11), placing President 
Kenyatta with the subnetwork in the lower left. Because most clustering algorithms 
partition actors into a single group, it had to place President Kenyatta into one or the other. 
Nevertheless, by splitting the component into two, it correctly detects that the component 
contains two distinct groups. And it is clear from Figure 26 that President Kenyatta is the 
broker between the two. 
Table 11. Girvan Newman clusters. 
Group Size Members 
1 17 Churchill Otieno, Faith Oneya, Pamela Sittoni, KSN, NTV, Daily Post, 
Kenya Daily News, Kenya Today, Nairobi News, Nation, The East 
African, Business Daily, Taifa Leo, Kenya Satellite News Network, 
Nation Media Group, Nation Media Group, Aga Khan Fund for 
Economic Development 
 
2 8 Samuel Maina, Rosalia Omungo, KBC, Kenya News, Kenyan News 
Agency, Government of Kenya, Government of Kenya, President 
Kenyatta 
 
3 8 Everlyne Kwabmoka, KTN, Kenyan News, SDE, Standard, Standard 
Group, SNG Holdings Limited, Lukoil 
 
4 7 K24, Kameme TV, Mediamax, People Daily, TV Africa Holdings, 
Media Max network LTD, Media Max network LTD 
 
5 7 Mwakilishi, Captial FM, Mwakilishi Media Group, Chris Kirubi, 
Mwakilishi Media Group, Chris Kirubi, Chris Kirubi 
 
Figure 27 presents the network’s largest component. It includes three members of 
the Kenya Editor’s Guild, with Nation Media Group as the owner and parent Company of 
the media outlets. Nation Media Group, and its leading shareholder, Aga Khan, have been 
involved in Kenyan media since Kenyan independence. 
65 
 
Figure 27. Media outlets, owners, and parent company. 
Figure 28 captures how isolated the Chinese media outlets are in the Kenya media 
landscape, reflecting the network’s overall disconnectedness, which leaves presents many 
opportunities to form ties. In short, the network allows for freedom of choice for the U.S. 
or a competitor to become involved in Kenyan media. 
 
Figure 28. China’s influence cluster.  
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APPENDIX B. MEDIA IN KENYA CODEBOOK 
A. MEDIA OUTLET 
Definition of Media Outlet: Media outlets are defined as publications, radio station, 
television network, or internet sites that disseminate information to the public within the 
geographic boundaries of Kenya. The viewership may reach outside the specified 
geographic boundaries, however for the purposes of this research, the media outlet reaches 
a national-level audience within Kenya. 
List of Media Outlets available within the geographic boundaries of Kenya: 
1. Citizen TV 
2. K24 






9. Business Today 
10. Daily mail 
11. Daily Post 
12. Ghafla 
13. Kenya Buzz 
14. Kenya Daily News 
15. Kenya Moja 
16. Kenya News 
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17. Kenya Today 
18. Kenyan News 
19. Kenyans 
20. Mwakilishi 






27. The East Africa 
28. Kenyan News Agency 
29. Coastweek 
30. Business Daily 
31. Capital FM 
32. Ghetto Radio 
33. People Daily 
34. Star 
35. Google 




B. OWNERSHIP AFFILIATION 
Definition of Ownership Relations: Ownership relates to the person or company 
which owns and operates each media outlet. 
 
List of Organizations which possess direct ownership of media outlets within Kenya:  
1. Royal Media Services 
2. TV Africa Holdings 
3. Government of Kenya 
4. Kenya Satellite News Network 
5. Standard Group 
6. MediaMax Network LTD 
7. Nation Media Group 
8. Business Today Media LTD 
9. DMGT 
10. Majani 
11. Kenya Buzz 
12. Kenya Moja 
13. Boxraft LTD 
14. Mwakilishi Media Group 
15. Ringier Africa 
16. Tuko Media 
17. Coastweek Limited 
18. Chris Kirubi 
19. GidiFidi MajiMaji 
20. Radio Africa Group 
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21. Alphabet Inc 




C. PARENT COMPANY AFFILIATION  
Definition of Parent Company relations: A Parent Company has a “controlling 
interest”153 in the media outlet ownership companies. The Parent Companies may exercise 
active or passive roles of control over the subsidiary media outlet owners.  
 
List of Parent Company Organizations to which the ownership companies belong:  
1. Royal Media Services 
2. MediaMax LTD 
3. Government of Kenya 
4. Nation Media Group 
5. SNG Holdings Limited 
6. Business Today LTD 
7. DMGT 
8. Majani 
9. Kenya Buzz 
10. Boxraft Ltd 
11. Mwakilishi Media Group 
12. Ringier 
13. Genesis Interactive 
 
153 Adam Hayes, “What You Should Know About Parent Companies,” Investopedia, accessed 
November 5, 2019, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/parentcompany.asp. 
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14. Coastweek Limited 
15. Centum Investment Company 
16. Gidi Fidi Maji Maji 
17. Radio Africa Group 
18. Alphabet Inc 
19. BBC Studios 
20. AT&T 
21. State Council- China (Government) 
 
D. LEADING SHAREHOLDER AFFILIATION 
Definition of the Leading Shareholder relations: The leading Shareholder may be 
an “individual, institution, or company that owns a share of a corporation’s stock.”154 Due 
to the possible involvement and management that a leading shareholder may have within a 
parent company or its subsidiaries, the Leading Shareholder relations creates a two-mode 
network between bother the Owners and the Parent Companies of the media outlets.  
 
List of the Leading Shareholders within each Parent Company:  
1. Samuel Kamau Macharia 
2. President Kenyatta 
3. Aga Khan 
4. Lukoil 
5. Badoer Investments Ltd 
6. Jonathan Harmsworth 
7. Majani 
 
154 “What Does A Shareholder Do,” UpCounsel, accessed November 5, 2019, 
https://www.upcounsel.com/what-does-a-shareholder-do. 
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8. Alix Grubel 
9. Peter Ward 
10. Chris Kirubi 
11. Leonard Stiegler 
12. Patrick Quarcoo 
13. Larry Page 
14. Tony Hall 
15. Randall L. Stephenson 
16. President Xi Jinping 
 
E. KENYA EDITOR’S GUILD COUNCIL MEMBERS155 
Definition of Kenya Editor’s Guild relations: Council members of the Kenya 
Editor’s Guild are individuals who want to “advance media freedom and professionalism” 
on the continent of Africa.156 The Council members are leading professionals in media or 
academia and associated with various institutions and organizations in Kenya. 
 
1. Churchill Otieno- President (Nation) 
2. Samuel Maina- Vice President (KBC) 
3. Everlyne Kwamboka – Council Member- Print (Standard) 
4. Sammy Muraya – Council Member – Television (Freelance) 
5. Faith Oneya-Council Member-Online (Nation) 
6. Dr. George Nyabuga – Council Member – Academia (University of 
Nairobi) 
 
155 “Council Members – Kenya Editors Guild,” accessed December 19, 2019, 
https://www.kenyaeditorsguild.org/about-us/council-members/. 
156 “Council Members – Kenya Editors Guild.” 
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7. Ruth Nesoba – Council Member- Radio (BBC) 
8. Pamela Sittoni – Trustee (Nation) 
9. Arthur Okwemba – Trustee (AWCFS) 
10. Macharia Gaitho – Trustee (Independent) 
11. Rosalia Omungo – Ag. Secretary/ CEO 
 
F. ATTRIBUTES 
1) Media Type: The Media Type classifies each of the outlets as either broadcast 
(television or radio), internet, newspaper or press agency. While most media outlets now 
have an online presence, these categories identify the medium each outlet employed at 
inception.  
Coding Scheme:  
1. Broadcast: Television or radio 
2. Internet: Represented only through online presence 
3. Newspaper: National newspaper circulation 
4. Press Agency 
 
2) Media Focus: The Media Focus classifies the primary purpose of the media 
outlet. These categories represent the primary purpose of the media outlet but may not 
include the full complement of programming or information made available through each 
outlet.  
Coding Scheme:  
1. Business 
2. Entertainment 
3. General Interest 
4. Shopper 
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3) Parent Company Flag: The parent company flag attribute lists the country in 
which the parent company’s headquarters is located according to information on Lexis 
Advance.  
1. Kenya 
2. United States 
3. Switzerland 
4. Russia 
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